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DUE PROCESS ALIGNMENT IN MASS
RESTRUCTURINGS
Sergio Campos* & Samir D. Parikh**
Mass tort defendants have recently begun exiting multidistrict litigation by
filing for bankruptcy. This new strategy ushers defendants into a far more
hospitable forum that offers accelerated resolution of all state and federal
claims held by both current and future victims. Bankruptcy’s structural,
procedural, and substantive benefits also provide defendants with unique
optionality.
Bankruptcy’s resolution promise is alluring, but the process relies on a
very large assumption: that future victims can be compelled to relinquish
property rights in their cause of action against the corporate defendant and
others without consent or notice. Bankruptcy builds an entire resolution
structure on the premise that the U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s untested
interest-representation scheme satisfies due process strictures. This Essay
questions that assumption and identifies two compromised pillars that could
render bankruptcy’s mass tort framework unconstitutional. First, the
process for selecting the fiduciary that represents future victims’ interests
and irrevocably binds them to the agreed settlement is fundamentally broken.
Second, the process by which bankruptcy courts estimate the value of
thousands of mass tort claims places too much pressure on a jurist unfamiliar
with personal injury claims. These compromised pillars raise the risk that
the victims’ settlement trust will be underfunded and will fail prematurely.
In this outcome, future victims would have no recourse but to argue that the
restructuring process did not satisfy due process and the entire settlement
should be unwound.
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This Essay proposes that the risk of a prematurely insolvent victim’s trust
can be reduced considerably by bolstering these two pillars. Our proposal
seeks to (1) rebuild the future claimants’ representative role in order to
ensure that future victims’ interests are effectively represented and
(2) recalibrate the claim estimation process by facilitating coordination
between the bankruptcy court and nonbankruptcy federal and state courts.
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INTRODUCTION
“Due process applies even in a company’s moment of crisis.”
—Judge Denny Chin1

Johnson & Johnson (J&J) is one of the most profitable companies in the
world, with a market capitalization of over $400 billion2 and a credit rating
better than the U.S. government’s.3 But the product for which the company
1. Elliot v. Gen. Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 829 F.3d 135, 161 (2d Cir.
2016).
2. Top 10 Companies in the World by Market Cap, BUS. INSIDER INDIA (Sep. 2, 2022,
6:30 PM), https://www.businessinsider.in/stock-market/top-market-cap-companies-in-theworld/slidelist/93952579.cms [https://perma.cc/7MD6-KRND].
3. See Thomas Kenny, Does It Matter If the US Regains Its AAA Bond
Rating?, THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-companies-rated-aaa-higher-thanu-s-government-bonds-417105 [https://perma.cc/YA2E-AJM8] (Dec. 29, 2021).
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is most famous has come under attack. Recent suits have alleged a link
between the repeated application of talcum powder and ovarian cancer. The
release of internal J&J documents has led to a modified view of talcum
powder and a better understanding of its effects.4 Adverse jury verdicts
against J&J culminated in a $4.7 billion verdict against the company in
2018.5 Despite discontinuing talc-based product sales in the United States
two years ago, the company still faces over 38,000 suits.6 These suits have
been consolidated in multidistrict litigation (MDL)7 in the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey.
MDL consolidation is frequently the precursor to comprehensive
settlement, but J&J remained defiant. Instead of settling, the company
effectuated an obscure corporate maneuver under Texas state law called a
divisive merger. The maneuver ostensibly allowed J&J to split the subsidiary
that held its talcum powder business into two separate entities and to freely
allocate assets and liabilities between them.8 The result was a new entity—
LTL Management, LLC—that holds all of J&J’s liabilities related to the
talcum powder business but none of its valuable assets. On October 14, 2021,
LTL filed for bankruptcy in the Western District of North Carolina.9
Why would one of the most profitable companies in the world even
consider bankruptcy?10 As explored in this symposium, mass tort defendants

4. Lisa Girion, Johnson & Johnson Knew for Decades That Asbestos Lurked in Its Baby
Powder, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/johnsonandjohnson-cancer/ [https://perma.cc/9U7P-SXDY].
5. The award was later reduced to $2.12 billion. See Jef Feeley, Johnson & Johnson Talc
Verdict Cut in Half to $2.1 Billion by State Court, DETROIT NEWS (June 23, 2020),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/2020/06/23/johnson-johnson-talc-verdict-cuthalf-billion-state-court/112001422/ [https://perma.cc/YQ3X-JZ2B].
6. See Steven Church, Director of 9/11 Fund Picked to Estimate Cost of J&J Talc
Claims, BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2022, 10:13 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2022-07-28/director-of-9-11-fund-picked-to-estimate-cost-of-j-j-talc-claims
[https://perma.cc/QTF2-BX6D].
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (defining and enabling MDLs).
8. See Samir D. Parikh, Mass Exploitation, 170 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 56 (2022)
[hereinafter Parikh, Mass Exploitation]. Given its extraordinary financial position, J&J’s use
of a divisive merger represents a questionable—though legal—strategy to access bankruptcy.
See Samir D. Parikh, Bankruptcy Is Optimal Venue for Mass Tort Cases, LAW360
(Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.law360.com/articles/1468363 [https://perma.cc/4XD5-WW3E]
[hereinafter Parikh, Bankruptcy Is Optimal Venue for Mass Tort Cases].
9. In re LTL Mgmt., LLC, 637 B.R. 396, 400 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2022); see also Jonathan
Randles, Becky Yerak & Andrew Scurria, How Bankruptcy Could Help Johnson & Johnson
Corral Vast Talc Litigation, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/howbankruptcy-could-help-johnson-johnson-corral-vast-talc-litigation-11626773400
[https://perma.cc/K4SK-24AD]. The case was subsequently transferred to and is pending
before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. See Vince Sullivan, J&J Talc
Liability Unit’s Ch. 11 Transferred to NJ, LAW360 (Nov. 10, 2021, 3:09 PM),
https://www.law360.com/bankruptcy/articles/1439777/j-j-talc-liability-unit-s-ch-11transferred-to-nj [https://perma.cc/UMA2-VY2P].
10. One of us has examined this phenomenon in great depth, including in one essay that
is part of this symposium. See Samir D. Parikh, The New Mass Torts Bargain, 91 FORDHAM
L. REV. 447 (2022) [hereinafter Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain]; see also Samir D. Parikh,
Scarlet-Lettered Bankruptcy: A Public Benefit Proposal for Mass Tort Villains, 117 NW. U.
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are increasingly filing for bankruptcy to resolve mass tort liability and impose
a new bargain on claimants.11 Bankruptcy’s structural, procedural, and
substantive benefits offer optionality that provides distinct advantages over
other mass aggregation procedures like MDLs and class actions. Unlike the
MDL statute, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code can bind all mass tort claimants,
including those filing claims in state and federal court and those filing claims
held by both current and future victims.12 Moreover, unlike Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”), which governs class actions in federal court,
the Bankruptcy Code does not require mass tort defendants to provide
claimants notice or an opportunity to opt out of the proceedings.13 Further,
bankruptcy allows mass tort defendants to achieve a global resolution of their
mass tort liability, typically using less protracted and less costly procedures
than those used in Article III and state courts. Mass tort claimants benefit
from this streamlined process because they receive compensation more
quickly with much lower costs.
These potential advantages, however, are premised on a significant
assumption: bankruptcy’s resolution framework can only bind future victims
because it satisfies due process requirements.14 This Essay examines this
assumption, focusing on the overlooked infirmities in the bankruptcy
framework and the unique challenges posed by mass tort cases.
Mass torts, such as those caused by asbestos exposure,15 mass marketing
of opioids,16 or large-scale sexual abuse,17 are defined in part by victim
heterogeneity. Mass tort victims generally present idiosyncratic injuries.18

L. REV. 425 (2022) [hereinafter Parikh, Scarlet-Lettered Bankruptcy]. See generally Parikh,
Mass Exploitation, supra note 8.
11. We use the term “claimants” rather than “plaintiffs” because, as explained below, the
Bankruptcy Code allows for the resolution of unfiled claims, even claims of future victims
who may not have suffered any harm at the time of bankruptcy. See PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF
AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.01 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2010) (using the term “claimant” to refer to
both plaintiffs with filed claims and those without filed claims).
12. See Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 452.
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), 23(c)(2)(B) (providing that for classes certified under
23(b)(3), “the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances”); see also Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1059, 1062–63 (2012) (citing sources supporting the premise that class actions for mass torts
are generally disfavored).
14. Because the Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy procedures are federal in nature, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, applies.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
16. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio filed
Dec. 12, 2017); see also In re Purdue Pharma, No. 19-bk-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Sept.
15, 2019); In re Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 19-bk-11292 (Bankr. D. Del. filed June 10,
2019).
17. See, e.g., In re Boy Scouts of Am., No. 20-bk-10343 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Feb. 18,
2020); In re USA Gymnastics, No. 18-bk-09108 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. filed Dec. 5, 2018); In re
Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-bk-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. filed Jan. 16,
2015).
18. See Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class:
A Cooperative Approach to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders, 99 TEX. L. REV. 73,
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Nevertheless, mass tort claimants are all victims of the same conduct. As a
result, to recover, each claimant must prove “common” issues of law and fact
with respect to that conduct.19 The proliferation of common issues of liability
in mass tort litigation therefore also defines the mass tort and binds the
claimants. These twin aspects of mass torts—(1) the heterogeneity of the
victims’ injuries and (2) the “commonality of issues” of liability20—
distinguish mass torts from other “high-volume” litigation.21 This dynamic
not only precludes global resolution of many mass tort cases, but it can lead
to a doomsday scenario in bankruptcy.
Imagine, for example, a mass torts bankruptcy involving both current and
future victims.22 Imagine further that the case produces a plan of
reorganization that relies on a channeling injunction to force all victims to
seek recovery by filing claims against a settlement trust. All defendants and
affiliated parties enjoy a form of immunity through the channeling injunction
and nonconsensual, third-party releases. A group of future victims then
emerges fifteen years after the bankruptcy case is closed. This group holds
high-value claims but faces a prematurely insolvent settlement trust. The
plan of reorganization does not contain a contingency plan to address this
scenario and creates an outcome where similarly situated victims will receive
wildly disparate recoveries.23
The victims in this example have only one argument: the claims
representative in bankruptcy did not adequately represent future victims and
agreed to an underfunded settlement trust approved by the bankruptcy court.
By failing to adequately represent the interests of the future victims, the

85–90 (2020) (discussing the heterogeneity of claimants in mass tort and similar litigation
involving a mix of large and small claims).
19. See David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the
Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 305, 305–06 (2014) (analyzing situations,
particularly in the context of mass torts, in which “numerous plaintiffs [have] claims against
a single defendant based on causes of action for damages or equitable relief that present the
same or similar legal and factual scenarios” (emphasis added)).
20. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Class Actions, 101 VA. L. REV.
1855, 1875–76 (2015) (noting distinction in mass torts between the commonality of the
defendant’s conduct and the heterogeneity of the plaintiff’s eligibility for relief); see also
Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation:
A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 965 (1993).
21. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 20, at 965–66; see also Robert H. Klonoff,
COVID-19 Aggregate Litigation: The Search for the Upstream Wrongdoer, 91 FORDHAM L.
REV. 385 (2022).
22. Asbestos exposure cases are the archetype. In these cases, harm may not manifest for
decades after exposure due to extended latency periods. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (noting the long latency periods among victims in proposed asbestos
class action).
23. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Imerys
Talc America, Inc. and Its Debtor Affiliates Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code at 41,
In re Imerys Talc Am., Inc., No. 19-10289 (Bankr. D. Del. May 15, 2020), ECF No. 1715;
Disclosure Statement for Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of TK
Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 144–47, In re TK Holdings, Inc., No. 17-11375
(Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 5, 2018), ECF No. 1630.
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representative and the bankruptcy process did not satisfy due process.24 If
successful, potential remedies could involve dissolving the immunity shields
distributed as part of the confirmation process. The global resolution reached
decades earlier would be unwound. This represents the ultimate doomsday
scenario.
Can bankruptcy procedures be modified to minimize the risk of this
doomsday scenario? We believe that the risk dissipates to the extent the
bankruptcy process can ensure that the interests of future victims are better
protected.25 This Essay argues that there are two particularly compromised
pillars that could render the process unconstitutional. First, we argue that
procedural and substantive changes should be made to the appointment
process for the future claimants’ representative (FCR). The FCR should be
empowered and incentivized to vigorously advocate for the interests of future
victims.
Simple modifications—including delineating reasonable
nomination and selection processes for FCRs—will help reduce the capture
risk that all FCRs face.26 Second, we argue that the claim estimation process
under the Bankruptcy Code is deficient and increases the risk of an
underfunded victims’ trust. We propose collaboration between the
bankruptcy court—which enjoys comprehensive, binding authority—and the
nonbankruptcy, district court—which has comparative trial and discovery
advantages, as well as experience with adjudicating personal injury claims.
More specifically, the bankruptcy court can strategically lift the automatic
stay27 for individual mass tort claimants to litigate their claims in federal

24. Cf. Stephenson v. Dow Chemical, Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding
that class action settlement of Agent Orange claims did not satisfy due process when the fund
for future victims went insolvent prior to the filing of the plaintiffs’ claims), aff’d by an equally
divided court in part, vacated on other grounds in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003). Stephenson
differs in material respects from the procedures for future victims in bankruptcy but highlights
the due process implications of the doomsday scenario we explore here. See infra Part III.
25. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) (holding that in
a settlement process of mass claims against a common trust administrator, there is no
requirement of individualized notice because those who receive notice are “likely to safeguard
the interests of all, since any objections sustained would inure to the benefit of all”); Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940). As discussed below, there is some case law that suggests,
without holding, that due process may require a stronger right to a “day in court,” although
the extent of that right may be adequately addressed under existing bankruptcy procedures.
For further discussion, see infra Part III.
26. For example, to improve the representation of the FCR, the bankruptcy court can
empower the FCR and present claimants’ attorneys to work with and rely on the efforts of
MDL’s “common benefit attorneys.” Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class
Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND.
L. REV. 105, 112 (2010). In doing so, the representatives can invest in common issues at a
similar scale as the mass tort defendant. See Campos, supra note 13, at 1074–76 (discussing
economies of scale in investing in common issues); Rosenberg & Spier, supra note 19
(showing, through a game-theoretic model, the scale advantages of joint investment in
common issues). This greater investment in common issues, particularly issues of general
causation and categories of harm, would reduce the risk of an underfunded fund for future
victims by maximizing the total liability of the defendant.
27. See Parikh, Bankruptcy Is Optimal Venue for Mass Tort Cases, supra note 8
(“[B]ankruptcy’s powerful automatic stay halts all creditor actions, including pending
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court or even in state court. In doing so, the bankruptcy court can coordinate
with nonbankruptcy courts to allow expedited discovery and trial for a
sample of representative cases that can provide guidance in estimating the
aggregate value of cases pending before the bankruptcy court.28
Ultimately, an FCR who aggressively advocates for the interests of future
victims will insist on greater accuracy in the estimation of claims.
Congruently, a process that provides greater accuracy in claim estimation
will substantially improve the representation provided by the FCR. Both
pieces work together to increase the probability of a sufficiently funded
settlement trust, which negates the need for future victims to assert due
process claims. Our proposal has the potential to create a coordinated global
resolution process for mass torts that can withstand decades of shifting sands.
Legal literature has overlooked the possibility of mass tort settlements in
bankruptcy being unwound due to a failure to satisfy constitutional strictures.
This Essay uncovers this possibility and proposes the means to avoid it.
I. MASS TORTS
Mass torts involve a single defendant who has engaged in tortious conduct
that injures a large group of dispersed, individual victims.29 Asbestos
exposure is the archetype,30 but other examples abound—including
fraudulent or negligent marketing of opioids,31 defects in mass-produced
consumer products32 and wartime herbicides like Agent Orange,33 defective
medical devices,34 carcinogenic side effects caused by pharmaceuticals,35
litigation against the debtor and can be extended to nondebtors in order to allow all key parties
to focus on negotiating a global settlement.”).
28. This is commonly used in MDLs through the use of bellwether trials and mediations.
See, e.g., Alexandra D. Lahav, A Primer on Bellwether Trials, 37 REV. LITIG. 185 (2018);
Adam Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275 (2017).
29. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT xv–xvi (2007);
Campos, supra note 13, at 1067–72 (citing Nagareda).
30. MDL 875, which consolidates all federally filed asbestos claims in the United States,
is the oldest active MDL in the nation. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL, DEBORAH HENSLER, JENNIFER
GROSS, ELIZABETH M. SLOSS, MATTHIAS SCHONLAU, ALLAN ABRAHAMSE & J. SCOTT
ASHWOOD, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 110 (2005), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
MG162.html [https://perma.cc/4TZX-BRKL] (click on “PDF file” under “Full Document”)
(explaining that asbestos exposure cases represent the “longest-running mass tort litigation in
the United States”); see also DEBORAH R. HENSLER, ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW (1991), https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7776.html
[https://perma.cc/PQ8R-YNGG] (click on “PDF file”).
31. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio filed Dec. 12,
2017); see also In re Purdue Pharma, No. 19-bk-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 15, 2019);
In re Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 19-bk-11292 (Bankr. D. Del. filed June 10, 2019).
32. E.g., In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088–89 (N.D. Cal.
2019) (discussing failure-to-warn claims involving Roundup weed killer).
33. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS
IN THE COURTS (1986).
34. See Karen Kenney, Dalkon Shield Gives Birth to a Generation of Lawsuits, CHI. TRIB.
(Apr. 30, 1985), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1985-04-30-8501260779story.html [https://perma.cc/A4WY-DDSR].
35. See HAN W. CHOI & JAE HONG LEE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PHARMACEUTICAL
MEDICINE 688–702 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing DES litigation).
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sexual abuse involving religious institutions,36 sexual abuse involving
nonreligious institutions,37 and other cases involving severe personal
injury.38
Mass torts all share two important features. The first feature, which has
attracted significant attention from both courts and scholars, is that mass torts
claimants are heterogeneous. This is clearly seen in the asbestos cases. For
example, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,39 the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the certification of a proposed class to settle asbestos claims. The
Court described the class members in this way:
[C]lass members in this case were exposed to different asbestos-containing
products, in different ways, over different periods, and for different
amounts of time; some suffered no physical injury, others suffered
disabling or deadly diseases . . . . [Moreover,] [s]tate law governed and
varied widely on such critical issues as “viability of [exposure-only] claims
[and] availability of causes of action for medical monitoring, increased risk
of cancer, and fear of future injury.” 40

In this case, the Court listed the primary ways mass tort claimants often
diverge based on (1) the injury suffered, (2) the extent of the injury, (3) the
specific cause of the injury, and (4) the law that applies to the injury.41 All
of these differences are a function of the variance among the mass tort
claimant population and temporal and geographical dispersion.42
But mass torts have a second noteworthy feature. Unlike other
high-volume litigation, such as automobile accidents or cases involving
COVID-19,43 the claimants in a specific mass tort are all victims of the same
conduct.44 This is because mass torts are caused by a common decision by
the mass tort defendant, such as whether to include glysophate in weed
killer,45 whether to aggressively market opioids despite their addictive
qualities,46 or whether to ignore repeated signs of sexual abuse being
perpetrated by an organization’s agents or volunteers.47 Because the liability
36. See, e.g., In re Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-bk-30125 (Bankr. D.
Minn. filed Jan. 16, 2015).
37. See, e.g., In re Boy Scouts of Am., No. 20-bk-10343 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Feb. 18,
2020); In re USA Gymnastics, No. 18-bk-09108 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. filed Dec. 5, 2018).
38. In re NFL Players’ Concussion Inj. Litig., 301 F.R.D. 191, 195 (E.D. Pa. 2014)
(discussing head injury claims of former NFL players).
39. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
40. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 609–10 (1997) (third and fourth
alterations in original) (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626–28 (3d
Cir. 1996)).
41. Id.
42. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.02 cmt. b(1)(B) (AM. L. INST. 2010).
43. See Klonoff, supra note 21.
44. See Campos, supra note 13, at 1067–72 (noting the “predominance of common issues”
in mass torts caused by the commonality of the mass tort defendant’s conduct); see also Sergio
J. Campos, The Commonality of Causation, 46 OHIO N. L. REV. 229, 241–46 (2020) (noting
that mass torts involve a “single choice” that affects a large number of plaintiffs).
45. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
46. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio filed Dec. 12,
2017).
47. In re Boy Scouts of Am., No. 20-bk-10343 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Feb. 18, 2020).
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of mass tort defendants will depend on facts concerning that common
decision, determining liability will involve issues of law and facts common
to the class.48
The commonality of the mass tort defendant’s liability stands in stark
contrast to the heterogeneity of the mass tort claimant’s injuries. Even
though the defendant’s common decision caused each of the plaintiffs’
injuries, those injuries can vary significantly in all of the ways identified
above. These factual and legal issues must also be proven in order for any
mass tort claimant to recover, but, unlike issues concerning liability, these
issues will typically be unique and idiosyncratic to each claimant.49
The commonality of the mass tort defendant’s liability and the
heterogeneity of the mass tort claimants’ injuries raises significant problems
in the resolution of mass torts. One issue that has garnered significant
attention is the conflicts that naturally arise among mass tort claimants. The
heterogeneity of the mass tort claimants can lead to conflicts among
claimants with respect to the terms of any global settlement or global
resolution of the defendant’s mass tort liability. For example, as recognized
by the Supreme Court in the context of asbestos litigation, and as particularly
relevant here, there is an inherent conflict between “the currently injured,
[whose] critical goal is generous immediate payments” and “exposure-only
plaintiffs,” who seek to “ensur[e] an ample, inflation-protected fund for the
future.”50 These conflicts have led courts and scholars to insist on, for
example, opt-out rights to allow claimants to protect themselves from these
conflicts.51
But a second issue that deserves much greater attention concerns the
disparity in incentives to invest in common issues. Assume that both mass
tort defendants and claimants are each generally rational about investment
decisions and thus will only invest in litigation to the extent that it will lead
to a greater payoff.52 For example, a claimant will not invest anything that

48. Campos, supra note 13, at 1071; see also Burch, supra note 20, at 1856–57.
49. See PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.02 cmt. b(1)(B) (AM. L. INST.
2010) (noting that mass torts involve “the need for individual evidence of exposure, injury,
and damages”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
805, 831–32 (1997) (noting that, in mass tort cases, “there is an immediate need to shift
downstream and find fact after fact with regard to each individual plaintiff”).
50. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997).
51. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.07.
52. Formally, one can devise a simple model for litigation in which a rational party will
only invest in litigation (e.g., legal research, discovery, expert witnesses, attorneys’ fees) to
the extent it increases the probability of recovery. Under such a simple model, both claimants
and defendants seek to optimize their gains and losses based on three factors: (1) the damages
recoverable (or the liability that may be imposed), L; (2) the probability of L being imposed
by the court, P; and (3) the costs of the litigation process itself, CP for plaintiffs and CD for
defendants. Under this model, plaintiffs seek to maximize their net expected recovery, or PL–
CP, while defendants seek to minimize their total expected litigation costs, or PL+CD. This
model is generally well accepted by law and economics scholars and is frequently used in the
literature. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
389–418 (2004) (examining the basic theory of litigation); see also Sergio J. Campos,
Christopher S. Cotton & Cheng Li, Deterrence Effects Under Twombly: On the Costs of
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costs more than their expected payoff.53 Similarly, a rational defendant will
not invest in litigation more than they would have to pay in expected liability.
Accordingly, both parties will have an incentive to tailor their litigation
investments in attorneys’ fees, legal research, discovery, trial preparation,
experts, and investigation to their respective expected payoffs.
In mass torts, the prevalence of common issues concerning liability puts
the defendant at a distinct advantage relative to the claimants. While
claimants will only invest in common issues relative to their individual
payoffs, a rational defendant investing in common issues will be sensitive to
the aggregate potential liability associated with that issue. To take a simple
example, a single mass tort claimant may forgo hiring a $10,000 expert if
their claim is worth only $5,000. However, a defendant facing one thousand
$5,000 claims is far more inclined to retain a $10,000 expert if one is
available.54
A rational defendant will invest in common issues based on their aggregate
liability, unaffected by how plaintiffs are organized.55 Indeed, regardless of
whether the plaintiffs proceed separately or group together—using voluntary
joinder, class action, MDL, or bankruptcy—the rational defendant will invest
in common issues as if it were facing the plaintiffs acting as a collective,
unified whole.
The inherent advantage that the mass tort defendant has in investing in
common issues is exacerbated by the heterogeneity of the mass tort
claimants. Ideally, mass tort claimants would organize to jointly invest in
common issues. Their heterogeneity, however, introduces collective action
problems that prevent this from happening. There are, most obviously, the
transaction costs of finding other claimants and agreeing to jointly invest in
common issues. But the internal conflicts that arise from heterogeneity
inherently introduce a “tragedy of the commons” situation.56 Some
claimants free ride off the work of others, or other claimants use their “veto”
power to frustrate collective efforts. Indeed, the opt-out rights insisted on to
protect against such conflicts have the counterintuitive result of making it
harder, not easier, for the claimants to overcome their collective action

Increasing Pleading Standards in Litigation, 44 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 61 (2015) (using this
model to address pleading standards in civil litigation).
53. Small-claims litigation is an example where, given the filing fees alone, “only a lunatic
or a fanatic sues for $30.” Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)
(Posner, J.).
54. To illustrate the point much more abstractly, with respect to common issues, claimant
#1 of a class, π1, will only invest in a common issue with respect to their own recovery, L1. In
contrast, a mass tort defendant will invest in a common issue with respect to the entire liability
associated with the issue, and thus will invest based on the entire class of claimants (π1 . . . πn)
and their losses (L1+L2 . . . Ln). See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
55. See David Rosenberg, Essay, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and
Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 395 (2000); see also Rosenberg & Spier, supra
note 19, at 315–16 (formally noting that defendant investment in common issues considers
total liability, regardless of whether the claimants proceed separately or collectively).
56. Campos, supra note 13, at 1085–88; see also Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra
note 10, at 460–61.
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problems and invest in common issues at a similar scale as the mass tort
defendant.57
Accordingly, the two core features of mass torts—(1) the heterogeneity of
the claimants and (2) the commonality of issues of liability—lead to a
situation in which the mass tort defendant has significant power and leverage
in the resolution process.58 The mass tort defendant can use its organizational
advantage to invest in common issues at a scale that the claimants cannot
possibly match without the help of collective procedures. Indeed, this can
allow the mass tort defendant to impose cheap “bargains” on the inherently
divided mass tort claimants unless the resolution process can be amended to
prevent this unfair advantage.
II. RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS IN BANKRUPTCY
A bankruptcy filing presents a dramatically destabilizing event for a
corporation. Nevertheless, increasing numbers of corporations facing mass
tort liabilities are pulling this lever, including 3M, J&J, Purdue Pharma, the
Boy Scouts of America, and USA Gymnastics. The motivation to file for
bankruptcy is multifaceted and frequently misunderstood, a result of
resolution deficiencies and opportunities throughout the judiciary as a whole.
A. The Rise of Bankruptcy Preemption
Corporate tortfeasors in large mass tort cases face the global-settlement
imperative.59 Key stakeholders and settlement funding partners will come to
the negotiation table only if a substantial amount of all victim claims60 can
be aggregated and resolved. Piecemeal settlements fail to address the black
clouds that deter investment and limit borrowing. 61 Supreme Court
precedent has made class aggregation unavailable for the vast majority of
mass torts.62 Indeed, most personal injury mass torts present too many
individual issues of causation and damages to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s
predominance and superiority requirements.63
57. Campos, supra note 13, at 1079–81.
58. See Rosenberg, supra note 55, at 394 (noting that in mass tort cases, “[w]ith class-wide
aggregation of the defense interest, the defendant exploits economies of scale to invest far
more cost-effectively in preparing its side of the case than plaintiffs can in preparing their
side”).
59. See, e.g., Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 461 (coining the phrase).
60. The phrase “all victim claims” as used herein includes all claims held by current and
future victims pending in both state and federal court.
61. There are exceptions, such as when a defendant benefits from piecemeal litigation by
“dividing and conquering” plaintiffs. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Kathryn E. Spier & Adrian
Vermeule, Divide and Conquer, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 417, 439, 459 (2010) (“Divide and
conquer strategies also appear in a variety of settings where a unitary litigant faces a group of
opponents. These include tort settings, for example, where a defendant is being sued by a
group of separate plaintiffs who will enjoy economies of scale in litigation.”).
62. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183,
212–13.
63. See Andrew D. Bradt & Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms:
Bristol-Myers Squibb & the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251,
1264 (2018); see also THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, ATTORNEY REPORTS
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Facing a tsunami of asbestos claims in the 2000s, the federal judiciary
turned to the MDL process to facilitate settlements in one centralized court.64
The initial results were encouraging, and the process emerged as the most
viable resolution mechanism for asbestos and non-asbestos personal injury
mass tort claims. Unfortunately, the MDL process has evolved in ways that
undermine the resolution model for most mass tort cases. This trajectory has
created a captive negotiation process for victims and defendants subject to an
MDL.65 Indeed, the MDL statute directs the district court to remand
transferred cases at the conclusion of relatively accelerated pretrial
proceedings.66 However, cases languish—sometimes for years—as the
process holds parties captive until a settlement is reached.67 MDLs have
other suboptimal facets,68 but the loss of autonomy and the possibility of
coerced settlements are the most troubling for victims and defendants.69
Bankruptcy is the only exit available to corporate defendants trapped in an
MDL. Bankruptcy preemption provides access to an alternative resolution
process and halts MDL proceedings for the debtor. For some entities, this
release from captivity would be sufficient motivation to pursue bankruptcy,
but the incentives go further.
Bankruptcy preemption ushers corporate tortfeasors into a far more
hospitable forum that offers accelerated global settlement. Bankruptcy
courts enjoy jurisdiction over all claims against the debtor, regardless of
ON THE IMPACT OF

AMCHEM AND ORTIZ 4 (2004), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/amort02_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U7A-MRHW].
64. This was, of course, after the Supreme Court rejected attempts to provide global
settlements using Rule 23 class actions. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
609–10 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999).
65. See Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 475 (“As of September 30,
2018, approximately 156,511 actions were pending in front of forty-eight transferee district
courts. From 1968 through September 30, 2018, transferee courts had received and resolved
approximately 516,593 cases. Of these civil actions, only 16,728 were remanded for trial. In
other words, only 3 percent of transferred cases escaped MDL capture; 97 percent of
transferred cases are resolved in the MDL court by dispositive motion or settlement.”
(citations omitted)).
66. See Richard Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation?: Toward a
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245,
2264–65 (2008).
67. See, e.g., In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 1999) (transferred cases languished
for over seven years); see also Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict
Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 836 (2017) (“[T]here is no right to opt out of
an MDL proceeding—once you’re in, you’re in, often for years until pretrial proceedings have
concluded.”); Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 126 (2013)
(explaining that MDL 875 for asbestos litigation was commonly known as the “black hole”
because transferred cases did not return to their transferor courts and were never actually
resolved).
68. See Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 457–60; Parikh, Bankruptcy
Is Optimal Venue for Mass Tort Cases, supra note 8.
69. Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 477–78 (“Agency principles break
down in the MDL process because the agents—plaintiffs’ attorneys—are invariably immune
from the instructions and wishes of the principals, the victims. Cases are guided by steering
committees, and plaintiffs’ attorneys and the MDL judge exercise absolute resolution control.
A truly surprising facet of the process is that victims are unable to exit.” (citations omitted)).
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whether they were filed in federal or state court.70 The bankruptcy court is
authorized to estimate the value of the claims that cannot be resolved in a
timely manner—in a mass torts setting, this describes just about all victim
claims, including unfiled claims held by future victims.71 As noted above,
although the MDL court can often persuade the parties to settle, such
persuasion is controversial and not always successful.72 In contrast,
bankruptcy courts can proceed directly to estimating claim value for purposes
of establishing a victims’ settlement trust. Bankruptcy courts do not need to
persuade the parties to settle as an alternative to the bankruptcy process.
Settlement is the bankruptcy process.
Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code delineates the unique estimation
process in bankruptcy.73 A bankruptcy court is authorized to estimate the
value of any contingent74 or unliquidated75 claim, “the fixing of which . . .
would unduly delay76 the administration of the case.”77 In other words, the
court is authorized to assign a dollar value to certain claims—including
claims that have not been filed in the case78—to allow a debtor to formulate
a global settlement offer for claimants.79
70. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
71. See id. § 502(i).
72. See Transcript of Proceedings at 4, 9, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.,
No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2018), ECF No. 58 (Judge Dan A. Polster explained that
“[p]eople aren’t interested in depositions, and discovery, and trials . . . . So my objective is to
do something meaningful to abate this crisis and to do it [immediately] . . . . [W]e don’t need
a lot of briefs and we don’t need trials.” (emphasis added)).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c).
74. A contingent debt is “one which the debtor will be called upon to pay only upon the
occurrence or happening of an extrinsic event which will trigger the liability of the debtor to
the alleged creditor.” Fostvedt v. Dow (In re Fostvedt), 823 F.2d 305, 306 (9th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Brockenbrough v. Comm’r, 61 B.R. 685, 686 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986)).
75. “A claim is liquidated ‘when . . . the amount due may be ascertained by computation
or reference to the contract out of which the claim arises.’” In re S. Cinemas, Inc., 256 B.R.
520, 534 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (quoting In re Flaherty, 10 B.R. 118, 120 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1981)).
76. Whether the fixing or liquidation of a claim will “unduly delay” the administration of
the bankruptcy case is a matter of judicial discretion, and the analysis depends on the “probable
duration of the liquidation process as compared with the future uncertainty due to the
contingency in question.” In re Roman Cath. Archbishop of Portland, 339 B.R. 215, 222
(Bankr. D. Or. 2006).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1).
78. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 591 B.R. 501, 530 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[C]ourts
[may] estimate the claims of future victims who, by definition, cannot file proofs of claim
because their injuries have not yet manifested.”).
79. Bankruptcy courts must have jurisdiction over a claim before the value of that claim
may be estimated for distribution purposes. See 11 U.S.C. § 157(b). And bankruptcy courts
lack jurisdiction over personal injury tort or wrongful death claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(B) (specifically excluding these types of claims from “core” bankruptcy
proceedings). Bankruptcy courts, however, have identified a loophole in this restriction. The
statute does not prevent courts from estimating these claims to allow the debtor to formulate
a plan of reorganization that will channel all current and future claims against the debtor to a
settlement trust for assessment and payment. See, e.g., A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H.
Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994, 1012 (4th Cir. 1986); see also In re Motors Liquidation Co., 591
B.R. at 531–32 (explaining that courts may estimate “the amount of liability for the debtor to
set up the fund and push through plan confirmation”).
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When estimating claims, the bankruptcy court is “required [to] evaluate
claims pursuant to the legal rules which may govern the ultimate value of the
claim.”80 But the court enjoys wide latitude; § 502(c) does not prescribe any
particular process for estimating claims.81 Bankruptcy courts can utilize
“whatever method is best suited to the particular contingencies at issue.”82
Courts have made full use of this grant of discretion, employing a variety of
unorthodox methodologies to estimate high-value claims, including
arbitration,83 record review,84 summary trial,85 evidentiary hearing,86 and
simple review of pleadings and briefs.87
The possibility of estimating the value of both state and federal claims held
by current and future victims is made more tantalizing by the bankruptcy
court’s ability to grant nonconsensual, third-party releases. The bankruptcy
process offers full liability releases for the debtor as well as other parties that
provide substantial contribution to the resolution of the case.88 This offer of
immunity entices affiliated corporate entities and insurance companies to
help fund the victims’ settlement trust. In exchange, the debtor’s plan of
reorganization imposes a channeling injunction that diverts all victims’
claims to the trust. The result is full immunity for protected parties.89 The
disparate puzzle pieces are forged together in the debtor’s plan of

80. In re Perry, 425 B.R. 323, 342 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010).
81. S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, FED. JUD. CTR., JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF MASS TORT
BANKRUPTCY CASES 90 (2005), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/gibsjudi_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PQY-CBRY] (“[N]either section 502(c) nor any provision of the
Bankruptcy Rules provides any guidance about the method the judge should use.”).
82. In re Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 307 B.R. 112, 118 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2004); see also In
re G-I Holdings, Inc., Nos. 01-30135 & 01-38790, 2006 WL 2403531, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.J.
Aug. 11, 2006) (courts should determine “the appropriate method of estimation in light of the
particular circumstances of the bankruptcy case before it”); In re Chavez, 381 B.R. 582, 587
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure provide any procedures or guidelines for estimation.” (quoting DeGeorge Fin.
Corp. v. Novak (In re DeGeorge Fin. Corp.), No. 99-32300-02, 2002 WL 31096716, at *10
(D. Conn. July 15, 2002))).
83. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Seaman Furniture Co. (In re Seaman Furniture Co. of Union
Square, Inc.), 160 B.R. 40, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
84. See, e.g., In re Perry, 425 B.R. 323, 343 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010).
85. See, e.g., In re Baldwin-United Corp., 55 B.R. 885, 899 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
86. See, e.g., In re Nova Real Est. Inv. Tr., 23 B.R. 62, 65 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982).
87. See, e.g., In re Lane, 68 B.R. 609, 613 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1986).
88. See Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 483.
89. Third-party releases are extremely controversial. See Adam J. Levitin, The
Constitutional Problem of Nondebtor Releases in Bankruptcy, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. 429
(2022). The Purdue Pharma reorganization plan initially sought to grant the entire Sackler
family comprehensive releases from conduct related and unrelated to Purdue Pharma and its
business, and protected any type of civil misconduct, including fraud, gross negligence, willful
misconduct, and deliberate ignorance. See Parikh, Mass Exploitation, supra note 8, at 65. The
order confirming the plan of reorganization was appealed and recently vacated. See id. Purdue
has appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit, and oral arguments were held in late April 2022.
See Jeremy Hill, Purdue Pharma Opioid Settlement Appeal to Proceed in Late April,
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 23, 2022, 10:40 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-andbusiness/purdue-pharma-opioid-settlement-appeal-to-proceed-in-late-april
[https://perma.cc/T2EE-W585].
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reorganization—an elaborate contract that offers comprehensive resolution
but that must be approved by creditors, including current victims.
The Bankruptcy Code contains provisions that allow debtors to circumvent
the holdout problem plaguing these cases outside of bankruptcy. The debtor
is authorized to place claimants into different voting classes.90 Each class is
allowed to vote on whether to accept the treatment proposed by the debtor’s
plan.91 But a class, and all the claimants in that class, are deemed to have
“accepted” a debtor’s plan and their treatment as long as a majority of
claimants vote in favor of the plan.92 This design allows debtors to
circumvent the unanimity requirement that often exists outside of
bankruptcy.93
These factors work together to increase the likelihood that the debtor will
be able to formulate a resolution that it finds attractive and then convince the
necessary number of victims to approve it. But policy makers have struck a
Faustian bargain. There is a fundamental flaw embedded in this structure—
one that will not manifest for years, perhaps decades, but could undermine
the entire resolution model.
B. The Risks of Blind Reliance
Mass torts present myriad complexities that deter resolution, but
defendants have discovered an efficient and accelerated resolution path in
bankruptcy. The process has the capacity to address the claims of future
victims while offering resolution certainty to defendants. The entire process
is premised on awarding immunity to the corporate defendant, insurers, and
affiliated individuals and entities through a channeling injunction. In
exchange, funds are placed in trust to compensate current and future victims
relatively equally. This model demands at least one significant leap of faith,
though. How can a defendant satisfy due process as to future victims when
many of these claimants do not know they will manifest harm and may not
even know they were exposed to tortious conduct?
As we explore in the next part, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to
resolve this question, content to instruct courts to accept the best due process
procedures available under the circumstances.94 Oddly enough, the new

90. 11 U.S.C. § 1122.
91. Id. § 1126.
92. The code also requires that claimants holding two-thirds of the value of claims within
each class must vote in favor of the plan for the plan to be approved. Id. § 1126. Section
524(g) applies to cases with claims based on exposure to asbestos and requires that 75 percent
of the voting victims must vote in favor of the plan for it to be confirmed. Id. § 524(g). This
section does not apply to non-asbestos mass tort cases. Id.
93. This holdout accommodation does not remove all complexity from the process.
Securing consent from each creditor class can still be difficult. Therefore, the code contains
a “cramdown” option, which allows a court to confirm a plan, even if not all creditor classes
have consented, as long as the class has been treated fairly and equitably and the plan does not
discriminate unfairly. See id. § 1129(b)(1).
94. Due process “requires only reasonable notice, and that reasonableness [i]s to be
evaluated by balancing the state’s interest in the existing notice scheme against the
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mass torts bargain, which has been used repeatedly over the last few years,
is built on an untested premise: future victims can be forced to accept pro
rata settlements and claim extinguishment even though they never received
notice of the case, lack opt-out rights, and have no recourse against key
parties.
III. TWO PILLARS RAISING DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
As explored in the last part, mass tort defendants have discovered an
efficient and accelerated resolution path in bankruptcy. But this process must
still satisfy due process. This may be difficult given the presence of future
victims. Can the bankruptcy process afford such victims due process when
traditional methods of protecting their interests, such as providing notice or
an opportunity to opt out, are unavailable?
In this part, we discuss the relevant law on due process and the
compromised pillars of the bankruptcy structure that threaten to undermine
constitutional strictures.
A. Due Process in Mass Tort Settings
Under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, “[n]o person . . .
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”95
Although the term “due process” does not have a precise, “technical
conception,”96 the Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he fundamental
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard,”97 which entails
notice “reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties . . . .”98
Despite this strong language, the Court has interpreted the Due Process
Clause to permit representative procedures that adjudicate the rights of absent
claimants, so long as the procedures “fairly insure[] the protection of the
interests of absent parties.”99 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.100 is instructive. The Court in Mullane reviewed a New York banking
statute that permitted small trusts to invest in one aggregate trust for common
administration.101 The statute permitted periodic judicial proceedings that

individual’s interest in receiving additional notice.” Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in
Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 216 (1992).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). As bankruptcy
proceedings are enabled under federal law, we will focus on the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, although the law surrounding procedural due process is the same for both.
96. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (“‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules,
is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”
(quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961))).
97. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (alteration in
original) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
98. Id.
99. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940) (discussing a class certified under
Illinois state law); see also Bone, supra note 94, at 214–19 (discussing Hansberry).
100. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
101. Id. at 307–09.
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settled all claims by beneficiaries concerning management of the trust.102 At
these proceedings, representatives were appointed to represent different
classes of beneficiaries, none of the beneficiaries could opt out of the
proceedings, and the only notice provided was a newspaper ad.103
Mullane is often cited for the proposition that due process requires notice
“reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties.”104 However, the
Mullane Court did not require actual notice or an opportunity to opt out for
those beneficiaries who could not be located because, among other things,
they had contingent or future interests.105 According to the Court, to require
more than newspaper notice “would impose a severe burden on the plan, and
would likely dissipate its advantages.”106 Moreover, those absent would be
adequately represented by those present in the proceedings.107
As demonstrated by Mullane, the Court has permitted representative
proceedings that adjudicate the interests of future victims when the interests
of those absent are adequately represented and when requiring more would,
in fact, undermine the interests of the claimants.108 Indeed, the Court would
later apply the same due process standards it articulated in Mullane to the
bankruptcy context, noting that “[p]robate proceedings are not so different in
kind that a different result is required here.”109
The Supreme Court provided more guidance in the mass tort context in
two decisions involving asbestos settlement class actions, Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor110 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.111 Although both decisions
focused exclusively on Rule 23, the Court addressed concerns that can be
understood as a “subtle revisitation of the law governing due process” with
respect to mass torts.112
The first case, Amchem, involved a class action proposed to globally settle
the asbestos claims of presently injured claimants with unfiled claims and
“future” or “exposure-only” claimants who had not yet manifested injury.113
There, the Court concluded that it could not certify the class action under
Rule 23 because, among other things, the proposed class action could not
102. Id. at 309.
103. Id. at 309–10.
104. Id. at 314; see also Christine B. Bartholomew, E-Notice, 68 DUKE L.J. 217, 225 (2018)
(highlighting that “Mullane v. Central Hanover [is the] the seminal case for notice”); In re
Placid Oil Co., 753 F.3d 151, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that “the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Mullane” is “the origin[] of due process jurisprudence in the pre-discharge notice
context”).
105. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
106. Id. at 318.
107. Id. at 319.
108. See Campos, supra note 13, at 1114 (recognizing that “Mullane . . . articulat[es] a
procedural scheme in which an action permissibly binds those absent because (1) it would be
self-defeating to require more and (2) the relevant entitlements are adequately protected”).
109. See Tulsa Pro. Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988).
110. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
111. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
112. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999
SUP. CT. REV. 337, 352 (discussing Amchem and Ortiz).
113. 521 U.S. at 604.
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demonstrate that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.”114 Specifically, the Court highlighted an inherent
conflict between the presently injured, who prefer “generous immediate
payments,” and the “exposure-only” plaintiffs, who preferred “an ample,
inflation-protected fund for the future.”115 The Court suggested that the
inherent conflict between the two groups would require the use of subclasses,
with each subclass having a different, independent representative to protect
the subclass’s interests.116
The second decision, Ortiz, builds on Amchem and is more relevant to the
current bankruptcy treatment of mass torts.117 That case involved another
class action settlement of asbestos claims, this time only involving claims
against a defendant and a third-party insurer who both agreed to establish a
limited fund to settle the claims.118 The fund was established to settle
litigation concerning the insurer’s coverage of the claims.119 Like in
Amchem, Ortiz included both presently injured and future victims.
Unlike in Amchem, the plaintiffs in Ortiz sought to certify a class action
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)—a category of class actions for situations in which
individual litigation “as a practical matter, would be dispositive” of
nonparties’ claims.120 Class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) do not
require the court to provide claimants notice or a right to opt out.121 The
Ortiz Court rejected the proposed settlement. It first interpreted Rule
23(b)(1)(B) as applying primarily to situations involving a limited fund that
cannot satisfy the claims of all claimants.122 It then concluded that the use
of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) was inappropriate because the proposed limited fund was
fabricated by the settlement, with “Fibreboard . . . allowed to retain virtually
all of its entire net worth.”123
The Court also highlighted the tension between presently injured and
future victims, suggesting that the class action attorneys accepted a lower
amount to “favor the known plaintiffs.”124 For the Court, this represented
114. Id. at 626; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring a proposed class action to show
that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”).
The Court also concluded that the proposed class action failed to satisfy the “predominance”
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that “questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Amchem, 521
U.S. at 625; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (setting forth the “predominance” requirement).
115. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626.
116. Id.
117. See generally Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
118. Id. at 815. The settlement was designed to end litigation involving the insurer’s
coverage of the claims. Id.
119. Id.
120. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
121. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (providing that, for classes certified under Rule
23(b)(1)(B), the court “may,” but not must, “direct appropriate notice to the class,” and further,
is not required to provide class members an opportunity to opt out).
122. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842 (although recognizing that the terms of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) are
more expansive, “[t]he prudent course . . . is to presume that when subdivision (b)(1)(B) was
devised to cover limited fund actions, the object was to stay close to the historical model”).
123. Id. at 859.
124. Id. at 853.
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“an egregious example of the conflict noted in Amchem resulting from
divergent interests of the presently injured and future victims.”125 This is on
top of the difficulty of computing the total amount of claims, a task the
district court below concluded that it could not assess accurately, although
the Court assumed that a computation of the total was possible.126
The Court further concluded that, given the conflict with the present and
future victims, the mandatory proceeding in Ortiz was especially
inappropriate given “our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should
have his own day in court.’”127 Nevertheless, the Court did recognize that
such a “day in court” is not strictly required, such as “where a special
remedial scheme exists expressly foreclosing successive litigation by
nonlitigants, as for example in bankruptcy or probate.”128
Both Amchem and Ortiz can be understood as requiring significant scrutiny
of representative procedures in mass torts, with the Ortiz Court emphasizing
that the day-in-court ideal is the rule and “the burden of justification rests on
the exception.”129 Nevertheless, Amchem and Ortiz align with Mullane in
recognizing that mandatory proceedings can satisfy due process, with Ortiz
even highlighting that special remedial schemes like bankruptcy can diverge
from the day-in-court ideal.130
Taken together, the Court’s decisions in Mullane, Amchem, and Ortiz
provide the relevant parameters for understanding the due process
requirements for resolving mass torts in bankruptcy. Indeed, bankruptcy
courts that have wrestled with the due process implications of mass torts in
bankruptcy have relied on these cases.131
Ortiz and Mullane provide foundational guidance on when procedures can
deviate from the day-in-court ideal. But the reasoning in Ortiz suggests that
the exception to the normal litigation process needs a special justification,
and part of the Court’s focus on the limited fund model was to identify, in
part, a situation in which a mandatory proceeding was justified as a matter of
due process.132 Mandatory, non-opt-out proceedings are necessary for a
125. Id.
126. Id. at 850.
127. Id. at 846 (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989)). For criticism of this
day-in-court ideal, see Sergio J. Campos, The Uncertain Path of Class Action Law, 40
CARDOZO L. REV. 2223 (2019).
128. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added) (citing Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762
n.2 (1989)); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 895 (2008) (noting that “in certain
circumstances a special statutory scheme may ‘expressly foreclos[e] successive litigation by
nonlitigants . . . if the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process’” (alterations in
original) (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989))).
129. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 245 (3d Cir. 2004) (relying on
Amchem and Ortiz to address due process concerns with the handling of future asbestos
liability under § 524(g)); see also In re Placid Oil Co., 753 F.3d 151, 154–55 (5th Cir. 2014)
(discussing Mullane in the context of due process requirements of notice for unknown
creditors).
132. One coauthor has argued that mandatory proceedings are always justified for mass
torts given the need to coordinate investment. See Campos, supra note 13, at 1066–67. In that
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limited fund because, without such a proceeding, current victims can
unilaterally recover at the expense of future victims.133 This “race to the
courthouse” reasoning has been used to justify other nonbankruptcy
mandatory procedures.134 Mullane is aligned with and permits deviations
from the normal litigation process when insistence on notice, opt outs, and
similar procedural rights may “dissipate” the underlying rights of the
claimants.135
This all suggests that deviation from the day-in-court ideal will depend on
the appropriateness of the mass tort defendants’ filing for bankruptcy. When
confronted with the issue, courts may insist on a “limited fund” to justify the
mandatory procedures used in bankruptcy. They may also simply defer to
the bankruptcy court’s determination of appropriateness because bankruptcy
is a recognized “special remedial scheme” that permits the use of mandatory
procedures.136
It is also worth noting that current bankruptcy proceedings do not
necessarily take away a claimant’s day in court. Claimants typically have the
option, for example, to bring suits against the trusts in nonbankruptcy
courts.137 Although technically providing a day in court, such suits do not
allow the claimant to challenge the defendant directly, or, more importantly,
to challenge the sufficiency of the trust itself.
This leads to the two main due process concerns with mass tort resolution
in bankruptcy. First, as highlighted by Amchem and Ortiz, a central due
process concern is the tension between those “present” claimants and those
“future” or “exposure-only” claimants who have not yet manifested an
injury. More concretely, “future victims must be adequately represented
sense, all mass torts involve “limited funds” insofar as the funds are limited by the
coordination efforts of the claimants. For more discussion of this with respect to the FCR, see
infra Part IV.
133. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.04(b) (AM. L. INST. 2010)
(concluding that mandatory proceedings are justified when remedies like limited funds are
“indivisible,” such that “the distribution of relief to any claimant as a practical matter
determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other claimants”).
134. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (permitting
interpleader procedure to process claims on a $20,000 insurance policy that could not satisfy
all claims).
135. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317–18 (1950); see also In
re Placid Oil Co., 753 F.3d at 154–55 (noting in the bankruptcy context that, in Mullane,
“[t]he Court specifically declined to impose upon the debtor ‘ordinary standards of diligence,’
given countervailing concerns for efficiency”).
136. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (citing Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755, 762 n.2 (1989)). It is worth noting that the issue of whether bankruptcy is filed in “good
faith” is contested in some mass tort bankruptcies. See In re LTL Mgmt., LLC, 637 B.R. 396,
419 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2022) (concluding that the filing was in good faith because “the continued
viability of all J&J companies is imperiled” by talc liability). For purposes of this Essay, we
simply flag the issue and assume for due process purposes that mass tort defendants are filing
for bankruptcy in good faith.
137. See In re LTL Mgmt., LLC, 637 B.R. at 413 (“[T]here have been numerous asbestos
trusts implemented under § 524(g) which provide tort victims with choices between receiving
guaranteed compensation under the trusts, or alternatively pursuing recovery against the trusts
through jury trials.”).
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throughout the process,”138 with the Court in Amchem, Ortiz, and even
Mullane expressing concern with the adequacy of representation of the future
victims by those present.
In part, the concern with the adequacy of representation of the future
victims can be addressed by the appointment of the FCR as a separate and
independent representative. This is suggested by Amchem’s insistence on
subclasses and Ortiz’s concern with current claimants perhaps settling for
less at the expense of the future victims. Indeed, courts have rejected
bankruptcy proceedings that have not provided a separate FCR.139 But
appointment of an FCR is insufficient by itself. The procedures surrounding
the appointment and powers of the FCR also matter to the adequacy of
representation of the future victims.
Second, a very real, concrete danger that underlies the concern for the
future victims is the risk that any fund created for the claimants will be unable
to comparably compensate current and future victims. The Court suggests
this in Ortiz, pointing out the significant “hurdle” to “mak[ing] a sufficiently
reliable determination of the probable total.”140 This is the “doomsday”
scenario we alluded to earlier, and there has been at least one nonbankruptcy
situation in which a court has permitted parties to reopen a settlement for
inadequate representation when the funds were exhausted.
In Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co.,141 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit permitted a due process collateral challenge to a settlement
involving Agent Orange claims because the settlement specifically excluded
claims that manifested after 1994.142 In doing so, Stephenson reiterated the
standard articulated in Amchem, Ortiz, and Mullane that adequacy of
representation is the relevant due process standard.143 Stephenson differs
materially from the modern uses of bankruptcy for mass torts. Unlike in
Stephenson, the settlement trusts used in the bankruptcy process do not
exclude any mass tort claimants. Moreover, other circuit courts have
prevented the relitigation of a court’s previous determinations on the
adequacy of representation.144 Nevertheless, Stephenson provides evidence
138. In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 245 (3d Cir. 2004) (first citing Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–28 (1997); then citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999); and then citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(I)).
139. See id. (rejecting a bankruptcy resolution of asbestos claims where the future victims
were not involved or represented in the creation of the settlement fund).
140. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 850.
141. 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d by an equally divided court in part, vacated on
other grounds in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
142. See id. at 261.
143. Id. at 258 (noting that “[j]udgment in a class action is not secure from collateral attack
unless the absentees were adequately and vigorously represented” (alteration in original)
(quoting Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 590 F.2d 433, 440 n.15 (2d Cir. 1978))).
144. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting
that Stephenson “is inconsistent with circuit case law”); see also Kevin R. Bernier, Note, The
Inadequacy of the Broad Collateral Attack: Stephenson v. Dow Chemical and Its Effect on
Class Action Settlements, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1033–38 (2004) (noting that Stephenson
erroneously relitigated the issue of adequacy of representation by erroneously concluding that
the interests of the plaintiffs were not previously considered).
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of a court, here the Second Circuit, showing a willingness to reopen
proceedings to the extent that procedural protections do not, in fact,
adequately protect future victims.
Accordingly, and assuming that the use of bankruptcy procedures is
invoked in good faith, the law of due process in the bankruptcy context
centers on (1) the adequacy of representation of the future victims and
(2) successfully computing the necessary funds for the victims’ settlement
trust. As addressed below, proposals that address infirmities within these
two pillars help ensure that the resolution of mass torts in bankruptcy accords
with due process.
1. Understanding the FCR
As noted above, a future claimants’ representative is tasked with
representing the interests of future victims in mass restructurings.145 Section
524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code mandates appointment of an FCR in cases
involving claims based on exposure to asbestos as a prerequisite to the
imposition of a channeling injunction.146 The legislative history explains that
this feature was included to help address due process concerns and has
become a fixture of the process.147 Indeed, an FCR is invariably appointed
in mass restructurings that do not involve asbestos claims and are not subject
to section 524(g).148
Bankruptcy courts appoint FCRs and task them with negotiating with the
mass restructuring debtor to determine the appropriate amount of funds for
the settlement trust.149 The channeling injunction deprives future victims of
their day in court, and provisions of the bankruptcy plan will preclude these
victims from opting out of any settlement reached in the case. The FCR is
intended to minimize the risk that plaintiffs’ lawyers, the debtor, insurance
companies, and current victims collude to appropriate value from future
victims, the group most impacted by a prematurely insolvent settlement
trust.150

145. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B).
146. See id.
147. Injunctions in Mass Tort Cases in Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Econ. & Com. L. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 76 (1992) (statement of Professor
Kenneth N. Klee) (“My own view is that that [a due process] challenge should fail because,
under Mullane, publication notice was given to unknown claimants, actual notice was given
to known claimants, and a future claims representative was appointed for future victims.
I would think that process should pass constitutional muster.”).
148. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of TK
Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 58–59, In re TK Holdings, Inc., No. 17-11375
(Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 15, 2017), ECF No. 1164.
149. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B).
150. Victim balkanization “is the process by which debtors pit current victims against
future victims with a simple threat: any attempt to secure comparable recoveries across the
victim class will lead to significant delays in case resolution and ultimately deprive current
victims of any recovery in the short term.” Parikh, Mass Exploitation, supra note 8, at 65–66;
see also Parikh, Scarlet-Lettered Bankruptcy, supra note 10, at 463–65.
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Without the FCR’s consent, the court will not confirm a plan of
reorganization that binds future victims through a channeling injunction.151
Consequently, the FCR occupies a unique and extremely influential position
within the resolution model. Despite this prominence, we were unable to
identify any judicial opinions assessing whether the FCR model in mass
restructurings satisfies due process strictures.
The FCR is in a position to negotiate aggressively and minimize the risk
of a prematurely insolvent settlement trust. This is the most daunting risk for
victims because victims facing a prematurely insolvent trust have no
recourse.152 The plan does not afford claimants a meaningful opt-out
right.153 The debtor has been dissolved. The debtor’s parent entity and all
insurance companies that contributed to the settlement have full immunity
through nondebtor releases.154 If the debtor’s assets were sold through
bankruptcy, the acquirer does not assume any pre-petition liability.155 In this
doomsday scenario, a disenfranchised tort victim has one course of action:
argue that due process was unsatisfied, in which case the only remedy is to
allow the victim to pursue causes of action against otherwise immune parties.
The need to avoid this outcome is clear, and the FCR is the linchpin. But
this doomsday scenario could unfold even when an FCR has been appointed.
As explored in the next section, what if the FCR failed to properly represent
the interests of future victims?
2. Section 502(c) and Claim Estimation
The claim estimation process further complicates this dynamic. As noted
above, § 502(c) allows bankruptcy courts to estimate the value of claims held
by both current and future mass tort claimants.156 In many cases, hundreds
of millions of dollars of claims involving complex scientific theory,157
medical evidence,158 and convoluted causation assessments must be valued
through an extremely truncated process. Resolution of these types of claims
outside of bankruptcy would normally take years of litigation, beginning with
numerous bellwether trials that would ideally produce representative rulings

151. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B).
152. See Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 489.
153. To date, plans in these cases have afforded claimants an opt-out right in name only.
See Disclosure Statement for Fifth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of
Purdue Pharma L.P. and Its Affiliated Debtors at 22, In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2021), ECF No. 2969. Claimants who opt out may recover only the
amount they otherwise would have received under the victims’ trust liquidation procedures.
See id.
154. See id.
155. See Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 494.
156. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., In re Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC, 504 B.R. 71, 75 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
2014).
158. See id.
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that could ultimately be extrapolated for settlement guidance.159 A very
different process emerges in bankruptcy.
Cases involving asbestos claims can rely on the extensive valuation history
that comes along with these types of claims.160 Claim matrices for asbestos
victims are readily available and allow for procedural shortcuts.161 But what
about cases that do not involve asbestos claims? Modern mass tort cases
rarely involve asbestos claims.162 Consequently, these cases lack historical
guidance on claim value, which further highlights the deficiencies of the
estimation process.
After an accelerated and incomplete discovery process, estimation
devolves into a battle of experts.163 Indeed, experts representing the debtor,
the official committees, and other stakeholders present speculative
conclusions that produce widely divergent financial estimates.164 The
bankruptcy court is tasked with sorting through this quagmire and selecting
the estimation that it finds most plausible.165 But the idea that the bankruptcy
court will—after only a few days of hearings—be in a position to determine
aggregate claim value is inexplicable.166
Bankruptcy courts are
inexperienced in adjudicating personal injury cases.167 But the estimation
process blithely overlooks this inexperience and allows jurists to liquidate

159. See id. at 74 (explaining that the victims’ committee and the FCR offered settlement
numbers “based upon an extrapolation from Garlock’s history of resolving mesothelioma
claims in the tort system”).
160. See id. at 87 (“This court, however, is not the first to attempt a global estimation of
asbestos liability and has the benefit of the collected experience of the courts that have
previously conducted estimations . . . . [These cases] form a base on which the court’s crystal
ball can rest.”).
161. See id.
162. See Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 453.
163. See, e.g., In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 115, 125 (Bankr. D. Del.
2006) (“Although there is no dearth of well-compensated experts willing to assume the task
of predicting the future asbestos personal injury liability of companies emerging from
bankruptcy . . . the number of possible variables makes any pretense to certainty illusory.”).
164. See In re Owens Corning, 322 B.R. 719, 725 (D. Del 2005) (the low expert assessment
of total liability was $2.08 billion, while the high was $11.1 billion); Menard-Sanford v.
Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 699 (4th Cir. 1989) (the range was $600 million
to $7 billion); Garlock Sealing, 504 B.R. at 74 (the range was $125 million to $1.3 billion);
see also id. at 86–87 (determining that plaintiffs’ attorneys had withheld material exposure
evidence that had unfairly inflated the debtor’s liabilities and the practice was widespread,
affecting many asbestos cases).
165. See, e.g., In re Armstrong, 348 B.R. at 134 (“Presented with three estimates of . . .
pending and future asbestos personal injury liability . . . the Court . . . finds that $3.1 billion is
a reasonable prediction . . . .”).
166. See Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy Courts
Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1695, 1714 (1998).
167. See id. Bankruptcy judges’ inexperience stems from the fact that they lack authority
to adjudicate personal injury or wrongful death claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).
Bankruptcy courts may not estimate personal injury or wrongful death claims for purposes of
making a distribution from estate assets. Section 502(c), however, allows courts to estimate
these claims in order to allow the debtor to formulate a plan of reorganization.
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thousands of claims after failing to conduct a single jury trial, take any victim
testimony, or assess historical data.168
Many jurists refuse to undertake this task,169 citing the process’s systemic
flaws.170 Unfortunately, courts in modern mass restructurings must estimate
claims. Plan confirmation is unavailable without this estimate.
In the next section, we explain how the reliance on the FCR and claim
estimation process creates a significant risk that various predictions and
assumptions made by the bankruptcy court will ultimately haunt the
process—potentially unwinding a hard-fought global settlement in entirely
unexpected ways.
B. Compromised Pillars
In his essay entitled The New Mass Torts Bargain, Professor Parikh details
the deficiencies of bankruptcy’s FCR selection and claim estimation
processes.171 The fear is that these dynamics distort resolution outcomes and
could create a constitutional quandary threatening victim recoveries.172
1. The FCR Pillar
In mass restructurings, the FCR is the sole representative for future victims
who customarily hold claims valued at hundreds of millions of dollars.
Naturally, these clients do not provide input in the selection process, and the
FCR operates without any client oversight. This creates a principal-agent
problem that is arguably unavoidable in the context of mass torts, but the
agency breakdown is even more pronounced than it seems. There is no
ex-post check on the FCR. Future victims who later emerge and come to
learn that the FCR agreed to disadvantageous terms lack meaningful opt-out
rights173 and cannot bring suit against the FCR, who enjoys broad immunity

168. See In re Armstrong, 348 B.R. at 115 (acknowledging that estimation under § 502(c)
involves making “predictions which are themselves based on predictions and assumptions’”
(quoting Owens Corning v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 322 B.R. 719, 721 (D. Del. 2005))).
169. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 562 n.16 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997)
(refusing to adopt an estimation process and urging the parties to reach a consensual
resolution).
170. See, e.g., In re Armstrong, 348 B.R. at 124 (“The best the court can do is to consider
the expert reports,‘ . . . while remaining vigilant to the potential bias that a party’s expert may
have . . . .’” (quoting In re Fed.-Mogul Glob., Inc., 330 B.R. 133, 156 (D. Del. 2005))).
171. Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10.
172. Some may argue that we are overstating the risk because bankruptcy has produced
numerous mass tort cases that have survived circuit court review. Keep in mind that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly taken up the issue of entrenched bankruptcy practices, only to
rule that the structures were unconstitutional and needed to be dismantled. See, e.g., Stern v.
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–88 (2011) (holding that bankruptcy courts lack authority under
Article III to enter final judgment on a variety of claims); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code’s jurisdictional grant to
non–Article III judges was unconstitutional); Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement
Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (holding nation’s first municipal bankruptcy law to be
unconstitutional).
173. See supra note 153.
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for all actions aside from fraud, gross negligence, and willful misconduct.174
This dynamic creates the need for a true fiduciary, but the FCR may not fulfill
that role.
The bankruptcy court overseeing the mass restructuring is tasked with
selecting the FCR. Oddly, bankruptcy courts have delegated this
responsibility to the corporate debtor—the very party against whom the FCR
will be negotiating.175 In these cases, the debtor proposes one FCR
candidate.176 Some courts have approved the debtor’s nominee without
considering other nominees.177 The only standard for these sole nominees is
that they be “disinterested,” which represents an extremely low bar focused
on whether the individual has any overt conflicts of interest.178 The FCR is
not a fiduciary for future victims and, once selected, is not monitored by the
bankruptcy court.179
The FCR model invites significant capture risk. A small pool of
professionals control mass tort litigation, and the process is characterized by
repeat players.180 FCRs receive significant fees and retain as legal counsel
the law firm at which they are a partner, thereby amplifying the benefit to
them.181 Therefore, the promise of multiple engagements is a truly distortive
incentive for these individuals. This promise can incentivize an FCR to
discount their invisible clients’ interests.182 FCRs seeking subsequent
engagements face extreme pressures to avoid taking positions that may
alienate key parties who will be involved in future cases.183
The FCR was designed to be a check on the code’s systemically deficient
claim estimation process. If an FCR is unable or unwilling to serve that
function, the estimation process can wreak havoc. The fear is that bankruptcy
judges—with woefully incomplete information and after holding hearings
over a mere handful of days—are forced to determine a valuation number for

174. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization of TK Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 23, at 76; see also
S. Todd Brown, Section 524(g) Without Compromise, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 102, 159.
175. See Mark D. Plevin, Leslie A. Epley & Clifton S. Elgarten, The Future Claims
Representative in Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange
Alliances, and Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Courts, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 271, 301–14 (2006) (“In almost every asbestos bankruptcy case to date, the bankruptcy
court has granted the debtor a presumptive right to select the FCR.”). This delegation is akin
to allowing the debtor to select class representatives and counsel for the official creditors’
committee.
176. See, e.g., In re Duro Dyne Nat’l Corp., No. 18-27963, 2019 WL 4745879 (D.N.J. Sept.
30, 2019); In re Fairbanks Co., 601 B.R. 831 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2019); In re Imerys Talc Am.
Inc., No 19-10289, 2019 Bankr. Lexis 1452, at *10–15 (Bankr. D. Del. May 8, 2019).
177. See cases cited supra note 149.
178. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
179. See Brown, supra note 174, at 159.
180. See, e.g., In re Fairbanks, 601 B.R. at 835, 841.
181. See Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 490.
182. In re Fairbanks, 601 B.R. at 835 (“The idea is that the [FCR] . . . will ‘go along to get
along’ to the detriment of future victims in order to be selected for the next case.”).
183. See Troy A. McKenzie, The Mass Tort Bankruptcy: A Pre-History, 5 J. TORT L. 59,
78 (2012).

2022] DUE PROCESS ALIGNMENT IN MASS RESTRUCTURINGS

351

the aggregate value of all claims in a case.184 This number will ultimately
represent the corpus of the victims’ trust and the entire amount available to
both current and future victims. As noted above, victims’ trusts in modern
mass tort actions have absolutely no contingency plan in the event of
premature insolvency.185
2. The Claim Estimation Pillar
The reality is that a pliable FCR results in a settlement negotiation that is
not held at arm’s length. The risk of this type of suboptimal negotiation
construct is evident in a number of different contexts, but the risk there is
often mitigated by client or judicial oversight—two factors that do not exist
in mass restructurings.
A rushed claim estimation process raises fears that the bankruptcy court
will miscalculate the funds necessary to support a funded settlement trust.
As noted above, ostensibly all active stakeholders benefit from plan
confirmation, while an underfunded settlement trust disadvantages only one
group: unknown victims, the group that is not actively engaged in the case.
As Professor Parikh has explained, mass restructuring debtors adeptly engage
in victim balkanization, an attempt to pit current victims against future
victims in order to facilitate settlements that may actually create disparate
treatment across victim classes.186 The unspoken threat is that any attempt
to fully fund the trust will lead to significant recovery delays for victims
currently suffering. The corollary to this threat is that the risk of trust
insolvency will be borne only by future victims. The result could be active
stakeholders demanding prompt resolution and current victims accepting a
moderately underfunded trust to avoid a protracted legal battle; after all, one
of the benefits of the bankruptcy process is that victims can secure
accelerated recoveries. But what happens if current victims are not willing
to sacrifice this benefit?
3. The Due Process Stress Test
The ultimate fear with compromised pillars is an artificially suppressed
settlement figure that creates an underfunded settlement trust. This
underfunding has no material consequence to the debtor, professionals in the
case, or current claimants. In fact, the consequences will not be apparent for
years after the plan of reorganization is confirmed. A settlement trust that

184. In some cases, the bankruptcy court is asked to assess whether the amount of funds in
the victims’ settlement trust is a “reasonable prediction” so as to comply with the plan
confirmation requirement that non–personal injury victims in these cases are not subject to
unfair discrimination. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1); In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348
B.R. 111, 115 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
185. See Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 493.
186. See Parikh, Mass Exploitation, supra note 6, at 65–66 (“[Victim balkanization] is the
process by which debtors pit current victims against future victims with a simple threat: any
attempt to secure comparable recoveries across the victim class will lead to significant delays
in case resolution and ultimately deprive current victims of any recovery in the short term.”).
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becomes insolvent in fifteen years as opposed to twenty-five years affects a
subset of the victim class. But this result creates a scenario whereby two
victims suffering comparable injuries due to tortious conduct committed by
the same tortfeasor, and who hold similar damage claims, receive wildly
different settlements, even though their claims were adjudicated through the
same judicial process. Early claimants could receive full payment of their
claims, while subsequent ones receive pennies on the dollar.187 Disparate
treatment on this scale undermines the process and basic concepts of equity
embedded in the bankruptcy system.
Potentially disparate treatment raises another troubling possibility.
Imagine a large group of future victims emerges fifteen years after the
bankruptcy case is closed. This group holds high-value claims but—due to
the channeling injunction—can seek recourse only against the settlement
trust, which is prematurely insolvent. There is absolutely no contingency
plan for addressing this scenario.188 As noted above, these victims have no
recourse against any key parties in the case.189
The victims in this scenario have only one argument: the settlement trust
is prematurely insolvent because the FCR failed to appropriately represent
future victims’ interests; as a result, the process failed to satisfy claimants’
due process rights. If successful, the remedy would involve disregarding the
immunity shields distributed as part of the confirmation process. The bargain
imposed decades earlier would be unwound. This represents the ultimate
doomsday scenario.
It is unclear whether bankruptcy’s resolution framework for mass torts can
withstand a due process attack. We believe that the general construct aligns
with Supreme Court jurisprudence, but the execution may create exposure.
As detailed below, we propose bolstering two pillars in the framework to
address this possible deficiency.
IV. A PROPOSAL
The previous sections highlight the possibility of infirmities in the
bankruptcy process forcing a court to unwind a global settlement years after
a mass tort bankruptcy case has closed. The Supreme Court and Congress
are both able to ostensibly eliminate this outcome, but we believe that the
possibility of that intervention is remote. This part delineates our proposal
187. The victims’ settlement trust in the Johns-Manville bankruptcy is the most prominent
example. By the early 1990s, trust administrators realized that the trust had insufficient assets
to pay prospective claimants the full value of their claims. Consequently, the trust was allowed
to begin paying claimants a pro rata share of the liquidated value of their claim based on a
percentage set by the trust. The percentage was initially set at 10 percent in 1995 but was
brought down to only 5.1 percent by 2022. See 2002 TRUST DISTRIBUTION PROCESS (2021),
https://www.claimsres.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2002-TDP-May-2021-Revision1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VQ5-QUL2].
188. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Imerys
Talc America, Inc. and Its Debtor Affiliates Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, supra
note 23; Disclosure Statement for Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of
TK Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors, supra note 23.
189. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
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to bolster two compromised pillars in the bankruptcy framework to
materially reduce the risk of the doomsday scenario.190
A. Rebuilding the FCR Construct
Supreme Court jurisprudence supports the premise that if the FCR selected
in a case proves to be inadequate, a plan of reorganization that contains a
channeling injunction and debtor and nondebtor releases cannot bind future
victims.191
The consequences of inadequate representation have received
considerable attention in the class aggregation context. Rules 23(a)(4) and
23(g)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instruct that class
representatives192 and class counsel193 must “fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.”194 Class counsel ultimately selects and proposes
the representative, but courts undertake a rigorous review. In many cases,
the corporate defendant will object to the adequacy of representation, but not
as an attempt to derail the class aggregation process—rather, because they
realize that an ultimate settlement could be unwound if the representation is
subsequently found to be inadequate.195
Rule 23’s adequacy requirement is designed to reveal conflicts of interest
and ensure that a class representative will represent the class “vigorously.”196
Courts assessing the adequacy of representation have demanded a robust
showing.197 And this scrutiny extends to class counsel. Rule 23(g)
delineates various criteria that the court must consider before appointing
class counsel.198
In the class aggregation context, court scrutiny does not stop after
selection. Courts have accepted an ongoing obligation to monitor the

190. Professor Parikh provides normative proposals for improving the FCR construct in his
essay, The New Mass Torts Bargain, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. 447 (2022). This section builds on
those proposals but focuses on modifications that will help address due process infirmities.
191. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273
F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d by an equally divided court in part, vacated on other grounds
in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
192. Naturally, in class aggregation, the class representative is an individual also asserting
a claim against the defendant. Nevertheless, Rule 23’s approach is a useful analogy.
193. Rule 23 makes clear that “[w]hether or not formally designated interim counsel, an
attorney who acts on behalf of the class before certification must act in the best interests of
the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 2003 amendments
(discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(2)).
194. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), 23(g)(4).
195. Note that, in class aggregation, the corporate defendant is incentivized to ensure
adequate representation. Inadequate representation allows class members to argue that they
are not bound by the settlement. Mass tort debtors do not have these same incentives.
196. See Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2012)
(quoting In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 290 (3d Cir. 2010)).
197. See id.
198. Rule 23(g) provides that, “[i]n appointing class counsel, the court . . . may consider
any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests
of the class . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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performance of the class representative and counsel and have removed
representatives in various cases.199
Rule 23 may not represent a flawless approach, but it is a viable one.
Unfortunately, few of the safeguards and practices delineated above are
apparent in the FCR selection process. This result is due in part to statutory
lapses. Section 524(g) originates the role of the FCR, and the general
construct outlined there has shaped the FCR process in other mass tort cases
not subject to § 524(g)’s strictures.200 But the section introduces the FCR as
an afterthought, providing that the court must appoint “a legal representative
for the purpose of protecting the rights of persons that might subsequently
assert” claims against the victims’ trust.201 The section provides no other
guidance, even though the FCR is arguably the only means by which the
bankruptcy process can satisfy due process strictures as to future victims. As
noted above, this inattention has led courts to formulate divergent and
deficient FCR selection processes and eschew monitoring responsibilities.
Our proposals are relatively straightforward. Primarily, § 524(g) of the
Bankruptcy Code—which currently only applies to cases involving asbestos
claims—should be modified to apply to all mass tort cases.202 With that
change, we could then shift to modifying the FCR nomination and selection
processes. As noted in Part III.B, bankruptcy courts have delegated to the
debtor the task of nominating individuals for the FCR position.203 The debtor
is invariably the only party who makes a nomination. And they nominate
just one person. The court then reviews this person under the extremely
forgiving “disinterestedness” standard, asking only if the individual has any
overt conflicts of interest.204 Acknowledging what may be a fait accompli,
motions seeking the appointment of an FCR are simple documents that
merely provide the nominee’s background and assert that there are no
conflicts.205
It is unclear why the debtor has been afforded this significant level of
control over the nomination process. The FCR position is extremely
lucrative and prestigious.206 There is no shortage of qualified individuals
199. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1765 (4th ed. 2008) (noting that “once class members demonstrate any degree
of mistrust or the named party’s representational abilities or motives are questioned, courts
give very careful attention to the Rule 23(a)(4) issue and may hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine the matter”); see also Philips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (“[T]he
Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent
the interests of the absent class members.”).
200. Section 524(g) applies to cases with claims based on exposure to asbestos. The section
does not apply to non-asbestos mass tort cases.
201. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B).
202. For more details regarding the expansion of § 524(g), see Parikh, New Mass Torts
Bargain, supra note 10, at 493.
203. See supra Part III.B.
204. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
205. See Debtor’s Motion for an Order Appointing James L. Patton, Jr., as Legal
Representative for Future Asbestos Claimants, In re Fairbanks Co., 601 B.R. 831 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 2019) (No. 18-41768), ECF No. 117.
206. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
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who would be willing to fill this vital role in high-stakes cases. We propose
amending § 524(g) to require that at least three nominees must be presented
to the bankruptcy court, and only nominees proposed by the U.S. Trustee
should be considered. The U.S. Trustee can certainly solicit nominees from
the debtor and other stakeholders but should enjoy full discretion regarding
which ones should be considered for the position.
In terms of selection, we propose amending § 524(g) to require that (1) the
U.S. Trustee in identifying FCR nominees and (2) the bankruptcy court in
appointing an FCR must believe that the individual will act as an objective,
impartial, and effective advocate for future victims, as well as being
disinterested and qualified for the position (the “Selection Criteria”).207
This rigorous review must also extend to the law firm that an FCR intends
to retain. Naturally, once appointed, FCRs hire the law firms at which they
are partners to represent them in the bankruptcy case.208 At the very least,
the law firms selected to represent an FCR must be scrutinized. Bankruptcy’s
permissive selection process has allowed one law firm to develop a monopoly
of sorts in this space. Indeed, since 2000, Young Conaway has represented
FCRs in twenty-three mass tort cases.209 This is no small feat considering
the infrequency with which FCRs have been appointed in that period of time.
We propose that selection of the FCR’s counsel receive the same scrutiny as
the nomination and selection of the FCR itself. We also see the value in a
statutory or court-created rule that an FCR may not retain a law firm in which
they hold an interest.
The last proposal we make addresses the failure of bankruptcy courts to
perform ongoing monitoring in these cases. As noted above, bankruptcy
courts have eschewed their opportunity to monitor FCRs and their counsel.210
Section 524(g) does not impose a monitoring requirement. We propose
amending the section to require that the court assess the performance of the
FCR and their counsel based on the Selection Criteria at three key stages of
the case: (1) when an estimation hearing under § 502(c) is requested,
(2) when the debtor files a disclosure statement, and (3) as part of any plan
confirmation hearing.
We believe that these relatively minor changes will bolster the FCR pillar.
The resulting interest representation model is more likely to withstand
judicial scrutiny and produce better outcomes to avoid prematurely insolvent
settlement trusts, thereby removing the need for future victims to pursue
relief based on due process lapses.
207. One of us has already argued that conceptualizing the FCR as guardian ad litem
presents an “improved framework.” Parikh, New Mass Torts Bargain, supra note 10, at 497.
208. This practice is typical, but it allows FCRs to double-dip by receiving compensation
as an FCR and then sharing in the fees billed in the case by other attorneys at their firm. An
FCR may argue that they are forced to share a portion of what they bill as an FCR with the
other partners at their law firm, but that is the reality for partners at all law firms and would
not justify double-dipping in the FCR context.
209. See Debtor’s Motion for an Order Appointing James L. Patton, Jr., as Legal
Representative for Future Asbestos Claimants, supra note 205.
210. See supra Part III.B.
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B. Recalibrating the Claim Estimation Process
Even with adequate representation of future interests through a robust and
well-incentivized FCR role,211 there remains a risk that the settlement trust
will not be able to satisfy all claims made against it. Indeed, in the
nonbankruptcy context, the exhaustion of a class action settlement fund led
to at least one successful due process challenge.212 Increasing the probability
of a sufficiently funded settlement trust reduces the probability of future
victims asserting due process claims and attempting to unwind the
settlement. Reducing the risk of insolvency will require a robust claim
estimation process that will sufficiently fund a settlement trust to satisfy all
present and future claims at the level prescribed by the plan of reorganization.
1. History May Be Misleading
The risk of premature insolvency may appear to be relatively low. Aside
from the Johns-Manville settlement trust,213 most settlement trusts designed
to address asbestos liability pursuant to § 524(g) remain solvent and have not
needed to dramatically reduce pro rata distributions to claimants.214 But the
success of § 524(g) settlement trusts in asbestos actions may misrepresent the
risk of insolvency for non-asbestos tort actions.
The claim estimation process, which establishes the amount of funds to be
placed in any settlement trust, requires an estimation of the value of the tort
claims the claimants have against the mass tort defendant-debtor. As noted
earlier in discussing mass torts, the value of the claims will turn on
(1) common issues of liability related to the mass tort defendant’s conduct
and (2) individual issues of damages related to the effect of the conduct on
each claimant. Because significant asbestos litigation occurred in the 1970s
and 1980s, the underlying issues of liability and damages were well
established by the time that the first settlement trusts were developed.215 As
a “mature mass tort,” the first trusts could rely on a wealth of previous
decisions on liability and damages to estimate the range of claims that
individuals may be able to bring in the future.216 Given this extensive history
of litigation, it is no wonder that the claim estimation process for asbestos
claims was fairly accurate.
211. Improvements in the FCR construct will also improve the claim estimation process.
This is because a better incentivized and independent FCR will advocate more vigorously for
a settlement fund sufficient to satisfy future claims. Thus, adoption of our proposed changes
to the FCR will have the further effect of reducing the risk of settlement trust insolvency.
212. See Stephenson v. Dow Chemical, Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d by an
equally divided court in part, vacated on other grounds in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003); see also
supra Part III.A (discussing Stephenson).
213. See supra note 187.
214. Tancred Schiavoni, Partner, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Remarks at the Fordham Law
Review Symposium: Mass Torts Evolve: The Intersection of Aggregate Litigation and
Bankruptcy (Feb. 25, 2022), https://vimeo.com/694126999 [https://perma.cc/VP5J-VML6].
215. For a concise history of this litigation, see Robreno, supra note 67, at 105–25.
216. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659, 660, 688–94 (1989) (discussing “mature mass torts,” using asbestos as the classic
example).
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Other mass tort claims in the bankruptcy system may not be “mature.” For
such claims, there has not been “full and complete discovery, multiple jury
verdicts,” or “at least one full cycle of trial strategies.”217 Estimating the
value of unmature mass tort claims, however, will not have the informational
benefit that comes from the extensive litigation of previous claims. This
information void, coupled with the other factors described above, may result
in inaccurate claim estimation that materially increases the risk of a
prematurely insolvent settlement trust.
2. Inter-court Collaboration
We propose that bankruptcy courts reduce informational deficits by
coordinating with nonbankruptcy courts to litigate a sample of such claims.
In other words, bankruptcy courts should leverage the procedural and
experiential advantages that nonbankruptcy courts possess in litigating
claims on the merits. Inter-court coordination can allow the resolution
process to capture (1) the speed and efficacy of the bankruptcy process and
(2) the thoroughness and investigatory powers of the trial court.
Inter-court coordination has occurred in previous bankruptcy proceedings.
For example, in bankruptcy proceedings involving A.H. Robins, a
pharmaceutical company, the district court withdrew the reference with
respect to certain issues related to debtor’s liability concerning the
intrauterine device, Dalkon Shield.218 The court withdrew the reference
“upon representation that the major aspect of the case required the services
of an Article III judge” and proceeded to conduct proceedings with the
bankruptcy court.219 Working together, the district court and bankruptcy
court jointly engaged in an estimation hearing in which “the parties each
conducted extensive discovery,” and the court “heard extensive medical,
statistical, epidemiological, and other expert testimony.”220 The resulting
estimation process benefited greatly from incorporating the unique strengths
of the two courts.
Coordination between the bankruptcy court and the district court can occur
without a withdrawal of reference. The bankruptcy court instead could “lift
the stay selectively to permit full trials of a representative sampling of the
aggregated claims.”221 Selective lifting of the stay would mimic bellwether

217. Id. at 659 (defining mature mass torts).
218. In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 743 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 746–47. Interestingly, “[r]easonably early on in the proceedings, the Court had
appointed Professor Francis E. McGovern as the Court’s expert to develop in cooperation with
[other parties] a reliable data base to aid in analyzing and determining the aggregate value of
Dalkon Shield claim.” Id. at 746. Francis McGovern later developed the concept of the
“mature mass tort” and developed a distinguished career as a mass torts expert. See McGovern,
supra note 216, at 692.
221. Concurrent Committee Educational Session: Business Reorganization: Class Actions
in Chapter 11 Cases: Proofs of Claim, Settlement and Confirmation, 040109 ABI-CLE 139
(2009).
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trials used in MDLs, “the results of which would then be extrapolated to the
group as a whole.”222 Indeed, selective lifting of the stay for certain claims
would also allow coordination between federal bankruptcy courts and state
courts. For example, in the bankruptcy case of the Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. (“PG&E”), selective lifting of the stay was used to try state law claims
related to forest fires in northern California.223 In that case, the bankruptcy
court reasoned that selective lifting of the stay would “help[] with the
imperfect method of estimating claims as must be done here in the
bankruptcy court.”224
In proposing the coordination between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy
courts in the claim estimation process, we do not propose a specific mode of
coordination. Nevertheless, we do want to emphasize that the comparative
advantage of nonbankruptcy courts in determining the value of mass tort
claims does not arise exclusively from trials themselves. Naturally, trials
provide data points for estimating the value of claims. The real value,
however, may stem from the opportunity afforded to the court to accurately
assess factual and legal issues, as well as from the court’s experience in doing
so in other similar cases. Ultimately, an accurate determination will depend
on (1) the power and experience to investigate the merits of these issues and
(2) the devotion and opportunity to investigate those merits.
For example, whether a mass tort claimant is likely to prevail on an
important, common issue of liability will hinge on the claimant’s ability to
obtain all relevant evidence concerning that issue and the amount of
resources that the claimant devotes to investigating the issue. For mass torts,
the issue of investment is particularly crucial, as the defendant’s greater
stakes in common issues of liability inherently leads to significant investment
in those issues.225
We recommend that any coordination between bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy courts focus on two important aspects of the litigation
process: (1) the availability of discovery tools for the claimants to fully vet
the claims and (2) the structuring of incentives of the representatives of the
claimants. Although we want to preserve the efficiency and speed of
bankruptcy proceedings, we encourage bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy
courts to afford parties some level of discovery to investigate the underlying
factual issues. As noted by one symposium participant, discovery is
necessary “to know where the dead bodies are.” Similarly, great attention
must be afforded to the incentives of the FCR and claimants’ other
representative parties to eliminate discrepancies in investment levels between
these parties and the debtor.

222. See In re Dow Corning, 211 B.R. 545, 571–72 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (rejecting
unitary-trial approach on common issue of liability concerning the debtor’s breast implants
but expressing approval of the use of bellwether trials in appropriate circumstances).
223. In re PG&E Corp., No. 19-bk-30088, 2019 WL 3889247 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 16,
2019).
224. Id. at *2.
225. See supra Part I (discussing this important aspect of mass torts).
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Ultimately, coordination between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy courts in
mass restructurings does not necessarily require elaborate, protracted
bellwether trials. Indeed, estimation processes involving a few accelerated
trials, bellwether mediations,226 or even consolidated proceedings like the
one used in the A.H. Robins bankruptcy, could produce fairly accurate results
and materially reduce the risk of a prematurely insolvent settlement trust.
CONCLUSION
The resolution of non-asbestos mass torts in bankruptcy is still a fairly new
development. Our goal in formulating these preliminary proposals focused
on rebuilding the FCR construct and facilitating inter-court coordination in
the claim estimation process is not to criticize the development but to initiate
a dialogue to guide it. Failure to satisfy due process requirements threatens
global settlements in these bankruptcy cases, a disastrous result for all
stakeholders. We hope our proposals minimize this risk and allow all parties
to realize the full benefit of this new, potentially more efficient resolution
process.

226. See Zimmerman, supra note 28, at 2275 (discussing the use of bellwether mediation
in mass tort litigation).

